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Context Matters – Rethinking the Resource Curse  
in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from a bad reputation. Oil and diamonds, 
particularly, have been blamed for a number of Africa’s illnesses such as poverty, corrup-
tion, dictatorship and war. This paper outlines the different areas and transmission 
channels of how this so-called “resource curse” is said to materialize. By assessing em-
pirical evidence on sub-Saharan Africa it concludes that the resource curse theory fails to 
sufficiently explain why and how several countries have not or only partly been affected 
by the “curse”. Theoretically, the paper argues that whether or not natural resources are 
detrimental to a country’s socio-economic and political development depends on a num-
ber of contextual variables, divided into country-specific conditions and resource-specific 
conditions (type, degree/level of abundance and dependence, resource revenue man-
agement, involved companies etc.). Methodologically, a future research agenda needs to 
examine the complex interplay of these contextual variables by adding sophisticated 
comparative research designs, especially “small and medium N” comparisons, to the tool 
box which has been widely confined to the juxtaposition of “large N” and country case 
studies.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Context matters: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen zum  
„Ressourcenfluch“ im subsaharischen Afrika 
Natürliche Ressourcen im subsaharischen Afrika haben zweifellos einen schlechten Ruf. 
Insbesondere Öl und Diamanten werden für eine Reihe von Afrikas Problemen wie Ar-
mut, Korruption, Diktatur und Krieg verantwortlich gemacht. Wissenschaft und Öffent-
lichkeit haben diese angenommenen negativen Effekte den „Ressourcenfluch“ genannt. 
Das Papier fasst zunächst die wesentlichen Argumente des Ressourcenfluchs zusammen. 
In empirischer Hinsicht schlussfolgert das Papier, dass die entsprechenden Hypothesen 
nicht erklären können, wie und warum einige Fallbeispiele vom Fluch nicht oder nur 
teilweise erfasst wurden. In theoretischer Hinsicht wird argumentiert, dass sich negative 
Effekte nur unter bestimmten Kontextbedingungen verwirklichen, die in allgemeine län-
derspezifische Bedingungen und ressourcenspezifische Bedingungen zu unterteilen sind 
(Typ, Grad an Abhängigkeit und Reichtum, Management des Ressourcensektors, beteilig-
te Konzerne etc.). 
In methodischer Hinsicht sollte künftige Forschung das komplexe und dynamische Zu-
sammenspiel dieser Kontextvariablen durch sorgfältige vergleichende Studien, insbeson-
dere so genannte „Small and Medium N“-Vergleiche, einfangen, welche die bisher domi-
nierende Beschränkung auf „large N“-Studien einerseits und Einzelfallstudien anderseits 
ergänzen.  
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1. Introduction1 
Natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa are obviously a subject both timely and pertinent. 
There is little doubt that natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa play an important role in 
contemporary Africa.2 They are not just the dominating commodities African govern-
ments and economies have to rely on in international trade. Not even the lack or scarcity 
of natural resources such as water, fertile land, or minerals and metals seems to be the 
most salient problem. It is rather the notion of the “resource curse” (Auty 1993) or the 
“paradox of plenty” (Karl 1997) that has been gaining prominence in the debate on Af-
rica’s development and numerous problems. A rapidly growing body of literature on the 
topic clearly illustrates that this development has been reflected in academia and the pub-
lic eye (e.g. Gary/Karl 2003; Traub-Merz/Yates 2004; Bannon/Collier 2003). 
Moreover, it is very likely that natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa will gain even 
more relevance in the near future and beyond. The constant increase of the oil price in 
2003 and 2004 may be subject to change in the future; other developments will not. The oil 
boom in the Gulf in Guinea has prompted expectations and concerns in the region itself 
and outside. U.S. government officials have declared African oil an issue of national secu-
rity. The hunger for oil is one reason why China’s interest in the region has been on the 
rise. The World Bank has tried to help prevent detrimental effects of oil production in 
Chad by introducing a special management regime in the oil sector: Revenues have to be 
used for development and poverty reduction, national and international oversight bodies 
supervise the process and have to approve oil-related expenditure. Political initiatives are 
not limited to the oil sector. The “Publish What You Pay”-campaign and the “Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative” aim at enhancing transparency in all mining and re-
source sectors. The “Kimberley Process” is designed to curb the trade with “conflict” or 
“blood diamonds” that (have) fuelled civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. 
In this context, the debate on the “resource curse” in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to en-
dure or – more probably – to gain momentum. Although the debate is already moving 
towards practical recommendations (USAID 2004; Bannon/Collier 2003), the subject seems 
to be somewhat trickier than the mainstream literature suggests. As examples such as 
Botswana or Namibia show, there is no simple automatism that turns natural resource 
wealth into a “curse”. The political economy of natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                       
1   The author is indebted to Jann Lay, Christian Mahnke, Andreas Mehler and Judy Smith-Höhn 
for their particularly helpful inspiration, comments and advice. 
2   Africa and sub-Saharan Africa will be used interchangeably in the volume. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   7 
 
 
 
and elsewhere is by far more complex and involves a wide range of aspects which have 
not been sufficiently addressed thus far.  
The paper starts by outlining the affected areas, concepts, approaches and transmission 
channels of how, precisely, the “curse” is supposed to materialize. It then briefly turns to 
the empirical evidence in sub-Saharan Africa showing that natural resource abundance 
obviously produces highly mixed results. The theoretical challenge seems to be first and 
foremost the careful conceptualisation of respective context conditions – beyond the state 
of the art. A future research agenda will have to deal with capturing respective interplays 
and dynamics by employing precise concepts and hypotheses. The paper argues strongly 
in favour of sophisticated comparative research designs (“Small and Medium N”) in order 
to tackle this methodological challenge and concludes that only an adequate study of the 
political economy of natural resources will smooth the way for successful intervention 
and prevention. 
 
2. Defining natural resources 
As a starting point it might be helpful to define what is generally understood by natural 
resources. In a broad sense, resources are literally auxiliary means, i.e. devices to reach a 
goal; in economy, resources are generally factors of production that promote development 
or growth. Natural resources are natural since they are “gifts of nature”. Raw materials 
such as water, fertile soils and subsoil assets are present without human intervention. 
Consequently, these natural resources must be differentiated from several other forms of 
resources such as physical, human and social and institutional capital.3 The wealth of na-
tions can be thought of as consisting of all these forms of capital, natural resources being 
just one special class of them (s. Lay/Mahmoud 2004: 5).  
Obviously, natural resources are not all alike: They have different characteristics, and this 
might entail different implications for the question as to whether and how abundance, 
scarcity or dependence affect economic and political phenomena. It is now widely ac-
                                                       
3   To begin with, physical capital means funds (available through services, revenues, taxes, loans), 
yet manmade production facilities such as roads and machines belong to this category as well. 
Well-educated and skilled people are referred to as human capital. Human capital, which is 
rather attributed to individuals, must not be equated with social capital, which above all de-
scribes interpersonal phenomena such as social trust that cuts across different segments of the 
population. In addition, both formal and informal political institutions, which include legal sys-
tems and property rights, can be described by the notion of social capital, but should be named 
more precisely institutional capital. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  8 
 
 
 
knowledged that the type of natural resource can indeed make a difference. The banana 
curse might be different from the oil curse, as Jann Lay and Toman Omar Mahmoud 
(2004) put it. However, there are not only several types of resources but several typologies 
of resources as well. The most obvious classification seems to be provided by natural sci-
ence and we can, for instance, distinguish between renewable resources such as grains, 
wood and fish and non-renewable raw materials such as gas, gemstones, metals and oil. The 
latter cannot be replaced once they have been used.  
In an economically more relevant perspective, Rick Auty (2001) differentiates between 
“point” and “diffuse resources” which basically refers to whether they are concentrated in 
certain areas or dispersed over the whole territory of a country. Phillipe Le Billon (2001, 
2002: 37) extends Auty’s typology by introducing the additional criteria of whether re-
sources, from the standpoint of the central government, are “proximate” or “distant” i.e. 
easily accessible and easy to control. Michael L. Ross’ (2003b: 55) somewhat similar typol-
ogy adds a more pronounced political science perspective by asking whether resources 
are “obstructable” (i.e. their trade can be blocked by opponents) and/or “lootable”, diffuse 
resources being more conducive to potential looting by rebel groups than point resources. 
Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler (2003) have highlighted the strategic aspect of 
natural resources which stems from three potential characteristics: 1) many types of natu-
ral resources open up ample opportunity for income (lucrative resources), 2) some raw 
materials such as oil or metals are key materials in industrial production, thus attracting 
foreign interest beyond profiteering potential (externally sensitive resources) and finally 
3) some natural resources such as water and fertile soils are simply crucial for the survival 
of the population (resources for survival). Hence, such resources are commonly connected 
to scarcity. Certainly there is little doubt that - ceteris paribus - the lack of resources pro-
duces social and political problems. However, with regard to violent conflict several stud-
ies have proven that abundance is more likely to contribute to violence (de Soysa 2000: 
127f.). It has even been argued that abundance is more detrimental to economic growth, 
social and political development than scarcity. Hence, the principal lack of natural re-
sources is not the focus of the current international debate nor of this paper. 
 
3. The Theoretical Argument: The “Resource Curse” and “The Paradox of Plenty” 
As a “paradox of plenty” (Terry Lynn Karl 1997) it is resource abundance that has been 
dominating the debate on resources in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Broadly spo-Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   9 
 
 
 
ken, it is argued that abundant natural resources do not produce the expected blessings 
but turn out to be a “curse” with regard to a number of aspects. 
It is no surprise that the “resource curse” in resource abundant states refers primarily to 
socio-economic development and to phenomena such as poverty and general economic 
decline. However, potential detrimental effects of resource abundance are not limited to 
that. Much public attention has been paid to natural resources as causing, triggering, ag-
gravating and prolonging violent conflicts. A third area that might be affected is govern-
ance, including aspects such as corruption, public institutions, and the state in general. 
More recently, the debate on Africa has discovered adverse effects of natural resources on 
the prospects for democracy. 
In any case, nobody would argue that the “curse” strikes over night once resource extrac-
tion or production has begun. There are certain transmission channels or causal mecha-
nisms that might turn resources into problems. 
It must be noted at this point that natural resources do not have an independent effect on 
each of the aforementioned sectors (socio-economic development, state institutions, de-
mocracy and peace). Effects are obviously interrelated and this can easily be illustrated.4 
However, this interplay is far from being precisely known and we do not claim to present 
a complex theoretical model at this stage. Moreover, we have to differentiate between 
direct and indirect effects, short, mid, and long term effects and between rather unsys-
tematic explanations and systemic approaches and concepts (e.g. “war economy” and 
“rentier state”). For the sake of clarity, potential or actual effects will be outlined sepa-
rately. The more direct effects will be assigned to the four possibly affected areas respec-
tively.5  
 
3.1 Socio-economic Development 
The political economy of natural resources is multifaceted and the literature offers a wide 
variety of socio-economic, political and institutional explanations of the socio-economic 
variant of the “resource curse”. Respective transmission channels and studies are listed by 
Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl (2003: 21f.) and Michael Ross (2003a: 20ff.). However, the 
                                                       
4   Violent conflict triggered by natural resources affects the prospects of socio-economic develop-
ment and democracy. At the same time, socio-economic development, lack of democracy and 
ill-performing state institutions are conducive to violent conflict. 
5   See appendix I. For other summaries of detrimental effects refer to Ross (2003) and Gary/Karl 
(2003). Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  10 
 
 
 
following paragraphs primarily rely on the summary by Jann Lay and Toman Omar 
Mahmoud (2004). Apart from the indirect effects due to violent conflicts and weak institu-
tions, the more narrow or direct socio-economic detrimental effects of resource abundance 
are at least threefold: Natural resources damage other tradable sectors and sources of eco-
nomic growth and development, stimulate unwise economic policies and make the econ-
omy vulnerable to external shocks.6 
Decline of other sources of development. Some authors have argued that natural capital 
“crowds out” human capital. According to Gylfason (2001), resource-rich countries neglect 
the development of their human resources because they are “blinded” by their resource 
wealth. In a more subtle manner the specialisation pattern of natural resource-rich 
economies may be interpreted as the driving force behind this crowding-out effect. Indus-
trialisation, i.e. the growth of the manufacturing sector, is typically accompanied by 
broad-based demand for medium-skilled workers. However, the dominating sectors in 
resource-rich economies, the service and the resource sector, primarily demand low-
skilled and only little high-skilled labour. 
Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) have argued that a characteristic feature of a typi-
cal “successful” development path is the growing importance of the manufacturing indus-
try in the early stages of development. The manufacturing sector exhibits important positive 
side effects (“externalities”), such as learning-by-doing effects or “economies of scale” (i.e. 
t e c h n i q u e s  o n c e  l e a r n e d  c a n  b e  u s e d  i n  o t h e r  s e c t o r s )  i n  p r o d u c t i o n .  R e s o u r c e - r i c h  
economies, however, specialize in sectors such as agriculture and mining without these 
externalities and with a negative impact on growth.7 Additionally, many natural resource-
based sectors have an enclave character, i.e. there are no linkages to the rest of the econ-
omy (Hirschman 1958). 
Furthermore, a resource boom is often accompanied by a real appreciation that causes the 
manufacturing and other tradable sectors to shrink and the non-tradable sector to expand, 
a phenomenon labelled the “Dutch disease”.8 The possible negative effect on long-term 
growth is shown by Sachs and Warner (1995) in an extension of the Matsuyama (1992) 
model. 
                                                       
6   For a more in-depth review of the body of literature see Lay/Mahmoud (2004). 
7   Matsuyama (1992) illustrates this effect in an endogenous growth model with externalities in 
the manufacturing sector. 
8   Following the impact of natural gas discoveries in the Netherlands in the 1950s (Corden 1984). Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   11 
 
 
 
The resulting limited degree of diversification of resource-rich economies produces de-
pendence and is the major reason for the high macroeconomic vulnerability of these econo-
mies. Although the possible link between macroeconomic volatility and growth is not 
theoretically well-established, it has been identified empirically as an obstacle to growth 
(Pallage/Robe 2003). One reason might be that it is difficult to anticipate whether price 
shocks are temporary or permanent. In the case of a transitory shock the government 
would want to smoothen the shock and prevent it from having a long-term negative im-
pact. Permanent shocks, however, require structural adjustments. These adjustments can 
be very costly in social terms in the case of a permanent negative shock, e.g. through gen-
erating unemployment.9 
Moreover, resource rich countries frequently suffer from declining terms of trade shocks. 
For instance, natural resources have often been claimed to be subject to Engel’s law, i.e. 
demand and thus their relative price would fall with rising incomes. Consequently, natu-
ral resources thus exhibit lower income elasticities of demand than manufactured prod-
ucts. In addition, northern manufacturers have been accused of exercising market power 
on commodity markets and forcing down prices.10 Therefore resource-based economies 
not only go through boom and bust cycles, but they also face a steady decline in the rela-
tive price of their export products. This means that the net barter terms of trade of re-
source-exporting and manufacture-importing countries tend to fall.11  
But even if there are no shocks, windfall gains (or losses) require wise economic manage-
ment. Inadequate policy responses may play a more important role in causing economic un-
derperformance than the economic consequences of booms and busts alone. A typical 
problematic policy response is excessively increased public sector spending in at least 
three areas: Firstly, governments might find the increase of public employment an attrac-
tive short-term policy instrument for reducing unemployment and buying off popular 
dissatisfaction. Secondly, higher public investment is often provided for economically 
questionable projects. Particularly large and prestigious projects (“white elephants”) be-
                                                       
9   The problems following windfall gains and losses are often due to wrong expectations about 
the nature of the shock. Whereas positive transitory shocks are considered to be permanent, 
negative permanent shocks are perceived as only temporary. The former case leads to unneces-
sary and costly changes in economic structures whereas in the latter case, necessary structural 
adjustment is delayed (for a more detailed discussion see Lay/Mahmoud 2004: 8). 
10  See Deaton and Laroque (2003) as well as the literature cited therein. 
11  Without a compensating increase in resource export volumes, the income terms of trade will fall 
accordingly, which, besides having a direct negative welfare effect, also limits growth pros-
pects, as it reduces the ability to import capital goods. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  12 
 
 
 
long to this category. Thirdly, the government may be tempted to promote import-
substituting or other sectors through subsidies.  
Expenditure cuts in all these areas are often not politically feasible as soon as the resource 
boom comes to end. As a result, the government may run into debt problems which may 
well come about even without this mechanism: Excessive borrowing may appear to be an 
acceptable risk given the seemingly never-ending windfall. In fact, almost all African 
natural resource rich countries are heavily indebted countries (s. Ross 2003a: 21; table 2.4). 
The abovementioned transmission channels through which natural resource abundance 
affects socio-economic development are not complete. Furthermore, an important dimen-
sion of the socio-economic effects is their interplay and dependence on political and insti-
tutional conditions. 
 
3.2 State, Institutions and Governance 
It is widely acknowledged that the quality of political institutions such as the type of 
property rights arrangements and the quality of state bureaucracy determines to a great 
deal whether natural resource rents will be managed to the benefit of the economy and 
society (Boschini/Petterson/Roine 2004). Yet the evolution of institutional arrangements 
itself may well be negatively affected by natural resource abundance. Respective trans-
mission channels (s. Lay/Mahmoud 2004; Ross 2003a: 24f.) include adverse colonial lega-
cies and the emergence of a rentier state that fuels extreme corruption, clientelism and 
neopatrimonialism, weakens state institutions and stimulates poor economic policies. 
H i s t o ri c a l  l eg a c i es  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  r es o u r c e ex t ra c t i o n  m a y  h a v e a n  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  
quality of institutions. Back in colonial times, political institutions and property rights 
regimes in many natural resource-rich economies were set up to ensure the smooth ex-
ploitation of natural resources.12 In such “extractive” colonies, institutions were designed 
in order to empower the colonial or state elite to extract minerals or plant cash crops. In 
contrast, in so-called “settler colonies” including the US, Australia and New Zealand, in-
stitutions were set up that generally protected private property. In extractive states, secure 
property rights were only provided for the politically and socially powerful colonial elite. 
The vast majority of the population had no effective property rights, not even civil rights, 
and hence faced a constant risk of expropriation. Such extractive institutions can endure 
                                                       
12  See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and Easterly and Levine (2002) as well as the lit-
erature cited therein.  Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   13 
 
 
 
after independence. The new state elites do not have incentives to opt for institutional 
changes since these changes might reduce the rents from resource extraction.13 Since most 
African countries happened to become extractive colonies (“mise en valuer”) rather than 
settler colonies – even Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were never comparable to 
the US, Australia, and New Zealand in this respect – the colonial economic legacy of Af-
rica has not been conducive to functioning institutions. 
The evolution of institutions is of course path-dependent. In some cases such detrimental 
institutions endured well after decolonisation. However, in many African countries such 
as Botswana or more recently Chad, abundant natural resources were discovered only 
after independence. Therefore and maybe more importantly, natural resource abundance 
in sub-Saharan Africa has shaped institutions and their quality in the post-colonial era, in 
particular those in the political domain. 
Political institutions in resource-rich countries have frequently been described using the 
concept of the “rentier state”. The concept of the rentier state goes back to Mahdavy (1970) 
who studied the problems of the Iranian economy in the 1960s. In general, the concept has 
been primarily linked to oil dependent economies in the Middle East.14 In countries that 
principally rely on rents from natural resources, the state plays a predominant role in the 
economy since a large share of resource rents typically accrues to the government. As a 
result, government becomes autonomous vis à vis its population because it need not tax its 
citizens but can instead use rents to repress and co-opt opposition or fuel clientelist net-
works (s. Ross 2001; see below). The resulting increased level of autonomy of the govern-
ment and the politically motivated use of rents by the elite tends to weaken the state; the 
lack of accountability may lead to corruption and plunder.  
In African cases such as Angola, Nigeria and the former Zaïre, mineral and other natural 
resources have been linked to systemic corruption and the weakness of state institutions. 
Douglas Yates (1996) has analysed the rentier state in Gabon. The concept of the rentier 
state is closely related to clientelism and – as a broader concept – neopatrimonialism, 
terms commonly used to describe political systems in sub-Saharan Africa (s. Bratton/van 
                                                       
13 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) mention two factors determining whether a colony 
would become a settler or extractive colony. First, the profitability of extractive institutions mat-
tered, which was of course linked to the value of the resources that could be extracted. In addi-
tion, a relatively high population density was required that provided a labour pool that could 
be forced to work in mining and agriculture. Furthermore, pre-existing institutions of corvée, 
tax administration or tribute may have made it easier to set up extractive institutions. 
14  See for example Mahdavy (1970) and Beblawi (1987) on Arab states, Shambayati (1994) on Tur-
key and Iran, and Yates (1996) on Gabon and other African states. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  14 
 
 
 
de Walle 1994, 1997: 62). Others have named similar or identical concepts “prebendal poli-
tics” or the “predatory state”. Jean François Bayart’s “politique du ventre” (1989; 1993), 
using resource rich countries such as Cameroon and (then) Zaïre as examples, was up-
graded to ”The criminalization of the state in Africa” (Bayart et al. 1999). Though neopat-
rimonialism and the rentier state can exist apart from natural resource abundance – as 
long as there are other rents such as official development assistance to maintain them – it 
is probably the fertile soil for such phenomena.  
Different initiatives such as the “Publish What You Pay” campaign, the UK-led “Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative”, and the specific oil revenue management system 
in the Chad- Cameroon-Pipeline Project have shown that it has become generally ac-
knowledged that “transparency matters”15 when it comes to managing natural resource 
income. 
Transparency is closely related to the concept of “good governance”. It must be under-
stood, however, that transparency is only one constituent element of good governance, 
others being efficient and fair allocation of revenues and non-harmful, participatory im-
plementation of policies including all relevant actors and affected communities. As al-
ready noted, the (potentially) vast revenues from natural resources tempt elites to divert it 
to private consumption or to spend income on “white elephant projects” and other mis-
guided economic policies. However, it is the character of politics in the rentier state that 
has particularly devastating effects on economic policies: The politically motivated alloca-
tion of resource rents may imply a tendency to over-consumption of resource rents (or 
even of over-extraction of resources). Since in most cases, resource rents will not be trans-
ferred directly but rather through subsidies, trade restrictions, or granting public sector 
employment, the state gets deeply involved in economic activities, which leads to major 
economic distortions and additional welfare costs (Auty/Gelb 2001). In a rentier economy, 
a large part of the population is hence involved in distributing and consuming rents and 
trying to get access to it, whereas only a few engage in productive activities; efficiency 
and dynamism in the economy suffer.16  
                                                       
15  This has in fact been the title of a conference on the ”resource curse” organised by the Heinrich-
Böll-Foundation in Berlin in May 2004.  
16  There is a growing volume of theoretical literature on the political aspects of the “economic 
resource curse”. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2002) illustrate the costs of politically induced 
misallocations in a formal model. On the costs of rent-seeking to growth, see for example Mur-
phy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993). Different mechanisms of how natural resource booms can lead 
to lower welfare in the presence of rent-seeking are reviewed in Torvik (2002). Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   15 
 
 
 
But even if development-oriented policies are pursued, resource abundance might affect 
development: By transferring the “psychology of windfall” to resource rich countries one 
might argue that having abundant natural resources discourages efforts to build a healthy 
institutional framework, including the set-up of an efficient state bureaucracy which itself 
is likely to participate in rent-seeking and corruption.17  
Any popular pressure to reform all these areas might be blocked through another feature 
of resource rich countries: Their lack of accountable democratic governments. 
 
3.3 Democracy and Human Rights 
The effects of natural resources on human rights in general and especially the prospects 
for democratisation and the consolidation of democracy in Africa – which, as John F. 
Clark (2005) points out, are two distinct phenomena – have not been in the heart of the 
debate thus far. With special reference to the Middle East and its autocracies, a theoretical 
framework is provided by Michael L. Ross (2001) that, albeit focussing on oil in a global 
perspective, can be applied to Africa and natural resources in general. Ross distinguishes 
between a modernization effect, a rentier effect and a repression effect.  
Lack of Modernization. In his famous quote, Seymour M. Lipset (1959) argued that “the 
more well-to-do a nation the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. Although 
modernization theory has been subject to harsh criticism and does not address the ques-
tion of resource abundance per se, one can argue that adverse effects of natural resources 
on growth and poverty reduction noted above can be conceptualised as indirect obstacles 
to democracy in respective countries. More importantly, modernization, in more sophisti-
cated terms, involves a number of social changes, typically as a result of industrialisation, 
that are rather the cause of democratisation and consolidation than economic prosperity 
alone. In this respect, specific features of rentier states might well produce growth – at 
least initially –yet fail to bring about societal and cultural changes such as occupational 
specialization, urbanization and higher levels of education, since the (potential) source of 
wealth stems from a small and isolated sector in economy. Ronald Inglehart (1997: 163) 
identified higher educational levels and rising occupational specialization as the respec-
tive intervening variables which produce a more articulate public as well as workers and 
employees who are accustomed to thinking for themselves whilst working and are there-
fore better equipped to organise and communicate politically. 
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Once these skills have been transferred to the political realm they facilitate the formation 
of social capital and a vibrant civil society that can act as a watchdog and a countervailing 
power to authoritarian governments, which in turn will further enhance the prospects for 
democratisation, the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of human rights in 
general. 
The rentier effect is closely related to the modernization effect and cuts into a number of 
aspects, some of which have already been noted with regard to the efficiency of institu-
tions. Generally, income from natural resources reduces the accountability of the state 
elite and the prospects for emerging countervailing powers to challenge the entrenched 
authoritarian governments. The “taxation effect” suggests that when governments derive 
sufficient income from natural resources, they will be less likely to tax the country’s citi-
zens. In turn, citizens will be less likely to demand accountability from them. As Douglas 
Yates (1996: 35) puts it: “There can be ‘no representation without taxation’”. In a more 
proactive manner, resource revenue can be used for patronage and cooptation, thus buy-
ing off demands for participation and accountability. This applies both to the individual 
level and the potential for groups that are independent from the state.  
Elites may not only use carrots to impede strong opposition, but sticks as well. This repres-
sion effect has two dimensions. Firstly, governments might spend resource revenue on a 
huge state security apparatus. Secondly, increased spending for the military, police and 
intelligence services might be the response to civil unrest caused by natural resources. 
Once natural resources have contributed to violence, almost inevitably, the prospects for 
democracy and even more so human rights in general, diminish and might further dete-
riorate though a repressive response by the government. 
Thus far, negative effects on the prospects of democracy have been limited to internal 
variables and domestic politics respectively. However, the framework should be supple-
mented by a pronounced international perspective: A final, more direct negative effect on 
democracy from natural resources derives from the fact that resources are externally sen-
sitive in two ways (Basedau/Mehler 2003): Particularly commodities such as oil and coltan 
have implications for the functioning of industrial production in foreign countries and, 
hence, become an issue of national security for these countries. Moreover, natural re-
sources are export commodities and open up opportunity for profiteering both for local 
governments as well as multinational companies. Consequently, resource rich countries 
become preferential trading partner and subject to foreign national interest. In this context 
of “perverse international incentives” (Gary/Karl 2003: 20), pro-democratic political pres-
sures become less likely and at the same time less promising, since the respective coun-Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   17 
 
 
 
tries do not rely on development assistance. Low pressures on Sudan in the Darfur crisis 
in 2004 have been motivated by Chinese and Russian interest in oil supply and arms 
trade. To make it worse, external rivalries over resource rich countries in “zones of influ-
ence” make it extremely improbable that different countries will agree on a joint effort to 
press for democratisation in a resource rich country. In a worst case scenario external in-
terest can be conducive to war. As pointed out before, this cuts down prospects for de-
mocracy and human rights dramatically. However, the linkage between natural resources 
and conflict is an issue on its own right. 
 
3.4 Peace and Security 
The possible detrimental effects of natural resources on socio-economic development, 
functioning of state institutions, accountability and legitimacy of governments have al-
ready been identified. Since these factors can be looked upon as “root causes” of violent 
conflict as well (s. Ross 2003a), they represent indirect effects of natural resources on vio-
lence. The more direct effects of natural resources on peace and violence, however, can be 
differentiated with regard to several aspects (s. Paes 2003: 96f., Gary/Karl 2003: 23f.). One 
has to ask whether natural resources are root causes, aggravating, triggering or prolong-
ing factors. Moreover, one should be aware of different conflict formations in terms of 
geography and involved actors. In the more analytic sense, however, the most fruitful 
connections between natural resources and conflict are related to a) motives for violence 
and b) means and opportunity for exert systematic violence and warfare. 
The debate on natural resources as a motive for violence has been dominated by the juxta-
position of “greed and grievance” (s. Berdal/Malone 2000, Collier/Hoeffler 2001). The 
grievance hypothesis claims that segments of the population or regions might feel de-
prived of the benefits of resource-related income (while possibly carrying the ecological 
burden of production) and therefore take up arms. Typically, grievance is associated with 
secessionist upsurges: When central governments (tend to) monopolize resource income, 
the resource producing regions might develop feelings of deprivation and grievances that, 
in turn, trigger violent secessionist movements such as in the oil-rich regions of Cabinda 
in Angola and in the Niger Delta or in copper rich Katanga in the 1960s.  
However, perhaps the most common present-day spurs to violence over resources are 
quarrels over their prize as booty. Their profitability stimulates, in the words of one 
World Bank report (Collier/Hoeffler 2001), the “greed” of both internal and external play-
ers. Though greed and grievance might sometimes be hard to differentiate, “greed” is not Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  18 
 
 
 
so much connected to perceived inequality but rather to narrow ambitions by individuals. 
In the resource-rich and ethnically heterogeneous Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
various rebel groups have not been seeking secession, but rather power over the capital 
Kinshasa in order to access resource-related benefits. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Congo-Brazzaville as well, the specific economic interests of the main players have always 
been amongst the primary issues. 
Even when other fuses originally ignite conflicts, the prize of mineral wealth can help pro-
long them. Thus political reasons initially drew intervention in the DRC by forces from 
neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, but these forces increas-
ingly acted like mercenaries or multinational companies that had taken their return in the 
form of prospecting rights for diamonds, gold and coltan. Oil fields developed in Sudan 
from 1994 on have given the conflict between north and south — which was originally 
genuinely political —a different coloration. In Angola and Sierra Leone, revenues from 
the sale of diamonds provided UNITA and RUF rebels with the funds to sustain their 
military fighting power for a long time. In Liberia, tropical timber served this purpose 
until 1997. 
Though greed and grievance are usually motives in civil wars, there are regional and in-
ternational implications. Greed might also be the motive for border conflicts over resource 
rich regions such as that between Cameroon and Nigeria (Bakassi Peninsula). The inter-
vention of several neighbouring countries in the war in the DRC has to some degree been 
motivated by the country’s vast natural resources. Large–scale, direct interventions by 
Western or other countries, such as in Iraq in 200318, have not been witnessed in sub-
Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War era. However, during the Cold War era, Western 
countries and especially France sent troops to support pro-Western regimes. Moreover, 
Western countries and/or multinational companies have supported warring factions be-
yond the Cold War era in order to gain or maintain control over externally sensitive re-
sources needed for energy supply or industrial production, not to mention the prospects 
for profit that go with it. In Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, rivalries over oil between US-
American and French oil companies apparently triggered French support for Denis 
Nguesso-Sassou, who succeeded in defeating former president Pascal Lissouba in civil 
war. 
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As Collier et al. (2003) have argued, violent conflicts not only require a motive, but also 
the means and opportunity for it. Formation, deployment and maintenance of armies and 
rebel groups is enormously costly. Natural resources such as oil, coltan and diamonds 
create opportunities for the required income. This income is unthinkable without an out-
side environment ready to trade resources, arms and all other kinds of supplies. Some, 
like Mats Berdal and David A. Malone (2000), even go so far as to talk of “war econo-
mies”, which describes a systemic interaction: Warring parties, multinational companies 
and arms dealers profit from a lawless situation that does not constrict their opportunities 
for enrichment and even widens them, given the absence of government monitoring. 
Profiteering or looting, as Michael L. Ross (Ross 2003b; Paes 2004) puts it, is especially 
lucrative if little infrastructure and know-how are needed to exploit the resources (tropi-
cal timber), if they are easy to handle and therefore ideal for smuggling (diamonds), or if 
offshore oil production facilities, for example, can easily be protected against attacks by 
opponents. Contrarily, onshore oil drilling facilities and pipelines are particularly vulner-
able to guerrilla attacks, thus creating opportunities for rebels (Paes 2003: 96f.).19  
Moreover, as argued above, when resource-related income is used to raise military spend-
ing in a pre-violence stage it might well contribute to already existing tension (see Paes 
2004; Gary/Karl 2003: 23), albeit the link between armament and violent conflict might be 
more complex and also includes violence inhibiting aspects. 
 
4. A Worst Case Scenario for Resource Rich Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
A Note on Empirical Evidence 
The theoretical approaches presented thus far seem to justify worst case predictions for 
resource rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa. And in fact, to some extent, negative over-
simplification has become fashionable in the public and partly in the scientific commu-
nity. At this point it is therefore indispensable to issue a warning against natural resources 
being viewed essentially as a “curse” for respective countries or a single cause for most of 
Africa’s problems. There are important empirical, methodological and theoretical consid-
erations to be made which suggest that natural resources alone are less detrimental as 
frequently perceived. Since theoretical and – to a lesser degree – methodological con-
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straints stem from empirical evidence, we will begin with a brief assessment of the em-
pirical evidence. 
Macro-quantitative and country case studies have proven that resource rich and depend-
ent countries are more likely to suffer from civil wars (e.g. Collier/Hoeffler 2001; Collier et 
al. 2003; de Soysa 2000) - and this is particularly true for sub-Saharan-Africa (Ross 2003a: 
17f.). Moreover, resource abundance and dependence is frequently associated with cor-
ruption and weak state institutions (Moore 2004; Yates 1996), authoritarian rule (Ross 
2001), as well as economic decline and poverty (Ross 2003; Gary/Karl 2003; Lay/Mahmoud 
2005). However, empirical evidence might not be as impressive as it seems at first sight.  
Firstly, the data base in macro-quantitative studies is often neither very reliable nor ex-
haustive, particularly in the sub-Saharan context. Secondly, indicators and operationalisa-
tions often lack validity with regard to the theoretical concepts. Frequently, abundance in 
resources is measured through dependence, both of which are principally independent 
and different phenomena (de Soysa 2000; see below).  
Thirdly, although detrimental effects seem more likely – notwithstanding studies that find 
contrary results (Herb 2003) –, the degree of probability is perhaps lower than expected. 
For example, the likelihood of violent conflict in highly resource dependent countries is a 
mere 30% according to Bannon and Collier (2003: 3). As Ross (2003a: 19) points out, “…for 
every resource rich country that has suffered from violent conflict, two or three have 
avoided it”.  
These statements refer to violent conflict in a global perspective, but they apply roughly to 
resource rich countries and other possibly affected areas in sub-Saharan Africa as well. If 
we compare the 15 major oil and diamond producing countries south of the Sahara we 
find a highly uneven profile of individual countries in terms of indicators for economic 
growth, human development, governance, democracy and peace (s. table 1). If we assume 
that resource rich countries have to perform below average by regional standards to be 
affected by the “resource curse”, we find three countries (Botswana, Namibia and South 
Africa) without any problematic effect(s) during the last 10 to 15 years. Gabon exhibits 
one negative rating and three countries (Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Guinea) display 
two negative ratings. Only two countries (DRC and CAR) seem to be fully affected.  
In terms of violence which is not measured against a sub-Saharan mean, the record might 
be worse compared to the 30% violence probability mentioned above and, with eight out 
of 15 cases exceeds 50%. However, the chart does not capture the intensity and the dy-
namics of peace and violence. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, there have been substantial Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   21 
 
 
 
peace processes in recent years. In Nigeria, the level of oil-related violence is still deplor-
able but rather low. The same applies to Angola, where violence is now limited to the en-
clave of Cabinda after the end of the conflict on the mainland in 2002. Diamonds and oil 
have been blamed for the conflict between UNITA and the MPLA, but evidently have not 
obstructed the end of this conflict. It can even be argued that relative revenue advantages 
on the part of the government helped defeat UNITA (s. Basedau/Mehler 2003). Moreover, 
the death of UNITA-leader Jonas Savimbi in early 2002, as a key factor for the peace ac-
cord in April 2002, points to non-resource related factors. The same may apply to Sudan. 
A peace agreement between the North and the South – which should not be confused 
with the Darfur crisis – was signed in early January 2005, whilst oil production continues 
to rise. 
 
Table 1: Socio-Economic and Political Profile of Resource Rich Countries* 
 Economic 
Growth 
1990-2003 
Human  
Develop-
ment 
2004 
Governance
2002 
Democracy
2004 
Peace 
1995-2004 
Negatively 
affected 
areas 
Angola Ø  - - - - 4 
Botswana  + + + + + 0 
CAR  - - - - - 5 
Congo,  DR  - - - - - 5 
Congo,  R.  - Ø - Ø - 3 
Equ. Guinea  +  +  -  -  +  2 
Gabon -  +  Ø  Ø  +  1 
Guinea -  Ø  Ø  -  +  2 
Liberia  + - - - - 4 
Namibia + + + + + 0 
Nigeria  Ø  Ø - Ø - 2 
Sierra Leone  -  -  -  Ø  -  4 
South  Africa  Ø + + + + 0 
Sudan  N/a  Ø  - - - 3 
  6 5 9 7 8  35 
* Major oil and diamond producers measured against sub-Saharan mean; Chad only begun oil production in 
2003 and has therefore been left out; columns 2-5: + refers to countries above SSA mean, - to countries below 
SSA mean, Ø around SSA mean; column 6: + no conflict, - violent conflict. 
For sources and coding see appendix III. 
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It would be premature to pass final judgements on causal relations in general and in the 
country cases under investigation at this point. In fact, the rather unsophisticated com-
parison we have undertaken is based on correlations and cannot establish causal relation-
ships. Yet this principally applies to more sophisticated quantitative studies as well. One 
should keep in mind that correlation and causation are not identical. It is always possible 
that relevant factors have been left out which might provide superior explanatory value.  
However, the rather sketchy evidence clearly indicates partial falsification of negative 
effects as predicted by the “resource curse” theory in some countries and some areas re-
spectively. Evidently, effects of natural resources differ significantly from country to 
country. 
 
5. The Theoretical Challenge: Context Matters 
Related to that but more importantly, the most serious objection to the “resource curse” 
derives from the empirical finding that the resource curse does not inevitably materialize 
but is merely a probability. Full or partial exceptions such as Botswana and Gabon are not 
just “lucky”. Exceptions and variations require theoretical explanation which are most 
likely found in the country-specific context, i.e. adverse effects of resource abundance are 
most likely only, or particularly, under certain contextual conditions. There is no trans-
mission channel cited above which works without the interference of other variables: For 
instance, boom and bust cycles above all affect countries that are dependent on certain 
volatile commodities. Unwise use of revenues and corruption might partly be due to 
country specific legacies or even due to idiosyncrasies of political leaders. Violent seces-
sionist movements are more likely in countries where resources are concentrated in cer-
tain regions and the revenue management system is perceived as being unfavourable by 
the region’s leaders.  
Hence, in the strict sense, there is no such thing as a “resource curse”. Socio-economic and 
political problems associated with natural resources are not created by supernatural 
forces. In fact, whether oil or other resources turn out to be beneficial or detrimental to a 
country’s socio-economic and political development depends on a fairly dynamic and 
complex interplay of a number of contextual variables. Otherwise a “miracle” would be 
needed to explain why several resource rich countries have been spared partly or fully by 
the “curse”. It might only be due to overoptimistic expectations of a “blessing” that re-
source abundance seems to be a “curse”. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   23 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding a certain tendency towards negative oversimplification, we do not im-
ply that the resource curse literature –at least the more serious scholars- claims natural 
resources to be an unchangeable destiny: “The natural resource curse is not destiny” (Ban-
non/Collier 2003: 11). A complex set of other factors always needs to be taken into account 
when assessing the causes of violent conflict (Ross 2003a: 19). However, we believe that 
this challenge has not been sufficiently addressed in the debate and research thus far. It is 
remarkable that the debate has started to give precise and extensive recommendations, 
especially in terms of transparency, efficiency in the resource sector, governance in gen-
eral and other contextual variables (Bannon/Collier 2003; USAID 2004; Gary/Karl 2003: 79-
82), but necessary theoretical and methodological conclusions for the initial effects of 
natural resources on political and socio-economic development (and their study) have 
hardly ever been drawn.  
It is not sufficient to theoretically acknowledge the general relevance of surrounding con-
ditions. A careful conceptualisation and empirical analysis of different – positive or nega-
tive – scenarios in different countries, their exact causal mechanisms and interplays as 
well as the relative weight of natural resources vis à vis the context – including different 
types of mechanisms - is needed. A comparative, more contextually sensitive study of the 
political economy of resources has begun only recently (Ross 2004; Snyder/Bhavnani 
2004). Thus, the following paragraphs aim at outlining some of the pertinent research 
questions and concepts. 
 
5.1 General Socio-economic and Political Country-Specific Conditions 
One can roughly distinguish between two sets of contextual variables that should be 
taken into account when discussing the effects of natural resources in any given country: 
Firstly, one has to assess the general socio-economic and political conditions that exist 
before resources are exploited (or this extraction becomes an option in the minds of ac-
tors). Variables such as relations between identity groups, the level and dynamics of 
socio-economic development, the design and functioning of public and state institutions, 
behavioural patterns of elites, political parties, the military and civil society - not forget-
ting the regional and global setting - have to be scrutinised carefully when studying re-
source-related problems in any country. The interplay of these variables can create prob-
lems independently from resource production and this has, in fact, been the case in coun-
tries such as the oil producing newcomer, Chad, since independence. In Sudan, for exam-
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North and South and cannot be attributed to oil production. Herb (2003) does not find 
consistent support for a negative effect of rentierism on the prospects of democracy but 
concludes that democracy scores in the surrounding region are strongly correlated with a 
country’s own democracy score. 
Hence, one should be cautious to attribute any problem exclusively to resource produc-
tion. Again, there is a difference between causation and correlation. And it is certainly 
possible that correlations turn out to provide significantly lesser explanatory value when 
general non- and pre-extraction country specific conditions are added to the framework of 
analysis.  
 
5.2 Resource Specific Conditions 
However, more interestingly, once resource extraction has started or has become a realis-
tic prospect in the minds of actors, the very same variables are more or less subject to 
change. Still, effects of resource production do not come about overnight. This is exactly 
where the specific conditions of resource exploitation in the country come into play, the 
second set of contextual variables. These conditions are actually variables, i.e. they can and 
do differ with regard to a number of aspects. Their variation can have a significant influ-
ence on the outcome. And their variation itself depends on non-resource specific condi-
tions. 
As already noted at the beginning of the paper, the type of resource makes a difference. As 
Jann Lay and Toman Omar Mahmoud (2004) have pointed out, the banana curse is differ-
ent from the oil curse. Oil is a special liquid. Its use in industrial production and the de-
pendence of Western industries on it make oil producing countries far more likely objects 
of foreign policy or even strategic interest than countries rich in agrarian products such as 
bananas or cacao. Moreover, macroeconomic vulnerability and the likelihood of boom 
and bust cycles and decline in terms of trade depend on the type of resource. Tradition-
ally, the oil price is very volatile, whereas copper, for example, was subject to a constant 
decrease in commodity prices during long periods. Others such as gold and diamonds 
tend to be relatively stable. 
Closely related to this distinction is the location and technical way of exploitation. The debate 
has been comparatively vocal in this regard: Auty’s (2001), Le Billon’s (2002) and Ross’ 
(2003b) typologies of “diffuse”/“point”, “proximate”/”distant” and “lootable”/”obstruc-
table”/”legal” resources belong in this context. Especially the regional concentration of 
resources has sometimes been conducive to secessionist insurgencies, when local commu-Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   25 
 
 
 
nities feel deprived of the respective benefits or suffer from ecological hardships such as 
oil spills. On the other hand, diffuse resources can be problematic since their exploitation 
is hard to control by the central state. Therefore, alluvial diamond production in countries 
such as Sierra Leone or the DRC is more suitable for rebel financing (or looting) in civil 
wars than the sophisticated mining of dept shaft gems in Botswana (Collier et al. 2003: 
127). In addition, diamonds can be fairly easily smuggled out of a conflict region whereas 
other commodities such as timber or oil demand a more or less advanced infrastructure 
which can be easily obstructed, destroyed or damaged by opponents. Accordingly, Mi-
chael Ross (2003b: 55) has distinguished between “lootable”/”non-lootable” and “obstruc-
table” and “non-obstructable” resources. Moreover, as Ross points out, the legality of a 
commodity is of relevance since illegal substances (such as drugs or “blood diamonds”) 
tend to command high prices on the global market, precisely because they are illegal. 
When rebel groups are willing to cooperate with criminal networks or run their networks 
abroad, they can greatly benefit from this trade. On the other hand, governments will 
rather try to avoid illicit commodities as a source of income since most of them are con-
cerned with their public image (Paes 2004: 94). One can add more examples showing the 
relevance of location and techniques of exploitation: Offshore and onshore extraction of 
oil and gas entails different implications for the likelihood of civil war. Whether resources 
are “obstructable” and “lootable” depends clearly on the type, but more precisely on their 
exact location and technical modes of exploitation. 
Of course, natural resource production conditions can differ with respect to the degree of 
abundance and the degree of dependence as a source of revenue. First of all, dependence may 
vary not only in terms of the value of natural resources as a percentage of exports or the 
GDP but also with regard to diversification within this dependence. Vulnerability to ex-
ternal price shocks is more likely if the country depends on a single commodity than if 
there are several different natural resources. More importantly, dependence and abun-
dance are not identical phenomena as often assumed in both academia and the public (s. 
de Soysa 2000: 113). A country can rely heavily on oil for exports, whilst wealth in this 
respect is questionable. Oil constituted over 75% of Nigeria‘s exports in 2002, but if we 
keep in mind that Nigeria’s population exceeds 100 million inhabitants by far then – sta-
tistically – one Nigerian would have earned a miserable 30 cents a day from the US$ 13.7 
billion Nigerian oil export sales in 2002. In contrast, the earnings capita in Equatorial-
Guinea would have been 50 times higher (US$ 14.87). In this case it can hardly be argued 
that dependence is a “proxy” for abundance. Oil abundance in Nigeria and Equatorial 
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And this is only statistics. Where the money from oil exports really goes to is a completely 
different story. The management of resource revenue can differ substantially. This cuts into at 
least two aspects: Who receives the money and how the money is actually spent. In prac-
tice, multinational companies and local elites all too often stuff their own pockets, thus 
considerably reducing theoretical wealth for society as a whole. But even the way in 
which resource income is spent will affect the socio-economic and political outcome. As 
mentioned above, depriving resource rich regions of benefits can trigger civil unrest. 
Wasting money on “white elephants” and other unwise fiscal responses to sudden wind-
falls are a common phenomenon but by no means necessary outcomes, as exemplified by 
Botswana, where diamond revenues have been spent on infrastructure (roads, health ser-
vice and education). Moreover, it is certainly possible that some of the losses are also due 
to poor administrative capacities in the general civil service or parastatal companies. 
Though seemingly the most relevant part of it, resource sector management includes 
more than just allocating revenues: Management embraces all activities in the upstream 
and downstream sector (see for oil Neumann 2005), and how it is done and who does it 
also makes a difference.  
The quality of resource sector management depends to a great deal on the actors directly 
and indirectly involved in resource exploitation. Whether local elites divert – for what purpose 
and to what extent – resource-related income is not subject to a natural law. Furthermore, 
the conduct of involved companies can make a difference. Multinational companies 
(MNCs) can readily bribe governments or accept sous table payments or secure an undue 
part of the income.20 They may not care about the environmental damage resource exploi-
tation may do to the production areas. Of course, involved companies are not all the same. 
One has to differentiate between “supermajors”, “majors”, “independents”, and “national 
oil companies” (s. Gary/Karl 2003: 11). It seems plausible that big or “reputable” MNCs 
(Bray in Bannon/Collier 2003) are more responsive to public campaigns by civil society 
groups and NGOs since they have a reputation to lose. This is particularly true for inter-
national financial institutions involved in resource production – for example the World 
Bank in Chad.21 The more problematic partners for resource rich countries tend to be 
small companies and/or high risk investors. It might be even more risky when resources, 
                                                       
20  In Chad, for instance, the government will earn only around 13% of total oil revenues. In Octo-
ber 2004, given the oil price flying high, the Chadian government has protested against the dis-
tribution practice. 
21  For a critical review of the oil management regime in Chad see Ian Gary and Nikki Reisch 
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for example diamonds in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone, are produced by small op-
erators or artisans. 
Since foreign or Western governments are often close to the interest of MNCs or have 
their own vested interests, as in the case of energy supply, their actions and reactions have 
to be considered as part of the equation as well. Although the analytic framework pre-
sented here puts stress on domestic processes, on the systemic level we have to be aware 
of international economic relations in the resource sector and their effects on the country 
cases. 
Finally, one should not forget reactions by the affected communities within the countries. 
Oil spills or feelings of marginalisation can prompt violent uprisings, yet not necessarily 
so. In Chad, regional leaders and civil society have thus far opted for peaceful protest. 
 
6. The Methodological Challenge: Capturing Complexity 
It is probably easier to make the case for complexity than studying it, but given the nature 
of the subject there does not seem to be a credible alternative. At least complexity refers to 
dynamics and interplays, the nature of possible links, concepts and hypotheses, and the 
appropriate research designs (s. also Snyder/Bhavnani 2004). 
 
6.1 Dynamics and Interplays 
The study of resource politics must include all contextual variables and their relative 
weight and dynamics must be understood precisely. As outlined above, a country’s gen-
eral socio-economic and political context must be assessed before resource exploitation 
becomes a relevant political and socio-economic issue. The resource specific context and 
its possible variations over time should be scrutinized carefully and it should be taken 
into account that, principally, it can depend partly on the general, pre-resource conditions 
of the country. It may turn out that the “resource curse” disappears when the pre-
resource context is entered in the equation. A simplified overview of respective dynamics 
is shown in figure 1. 
After that, the next crucial step is a careful analysis of the link between the resource spe-
cific context and the political and socio-economic variables. As a matter of fact, these vari-
ables belong to the general conditions of the country and it is essential to single out 
whether their change is caused by the resource specific context or by other developments.  Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  28 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dynamics of Resource Politics (simplified) 
 
 
Having said this, possible complexity is not confined to linear sequential relations over 
time. Since resource abundance or dependence affect at least four areas, and socio-
economic development and political developments are interrelated in a number of ways, 
multifaceted complex mechanisms, interplays as well as direct and indirect effects are 
more likely than simple relations (s. figure 2). 
Figure 2: Interplay of Resource Politics (simplified) 
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6.2 Rethinking the Direction and Nature of the Relationship 
The debate on the “resource curse” has stressed on negative aspects and has been quite 
silent about positive effects. We must allow ourselves to think of the effects of natural 
resources not only as necessarily detrimental but potentially beneficial, or even neutral as 
well. Naïve overoptimistic expectations on the windfalls should not be replaced by the 
now fancy worst-case scenarios. In essence, the “resource curse” theory claims that re-
spective countries would perform better without resources. Is that true? For example, it is 
rarely taken into account that oil-importing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experi-
enced severe economic hardships in times of high oil prices. Would resource rich coun-
tries such as Botswana and Gabon be better off without their assets? Is there any realistic 
prospect for Chad to develop without its oil? Even in terms of violent conflict, natural 
resources offer a potential for avoiding or ending them: Co-opting opposition may hinder 
democratisation, but this kind of rentier-effect (Ross 2001) is not consistent with any 
grievance-related violence caused by natural resources. This suggests that there might be 
several types of “curses”, one being the autocratic rentier type, another the civil war type. 
And even if that sounds cynical, natural resources can help end wars when revenue is 
used to impose a victor’s peace as in Angola in 2002: The prospect to participate in oil 
trade can motivate powerful international actors to press for peace, as has been the case in 
Sudan since 2003.22 
 
6.3 Concepts and Hypotheses 
In any case, complexity cannot be understood fully unless we have clear-cut concepts of 
the phenomena under investigation. It has already been noted that resource abundance 
and dependence are not identical phenomena. The debate, however, has treated these 
phenomena as synonyms and most of the quantitative research only pretends to study 
resource wealth, when in fact dealing with resource dependent states. Moreover, John 
Clark’s distinction between prospects for democratisation and the consolidation of de-
mocracy is a case in point, yet the need for careful conceptualisation applies to all key 
concepts in the study. In fact, there can be no meaningful cross-country analysis and 
comparison without transparent and valid concepts (Dogan/Pelassy 1984; Nohlen 1994, 
2002). 
                                                       
22  The peace accord between Khartoum and the SPLA, signed on January 9, 2005, has been facili-
tated by US officials. It must not be confused with the war in Darfur. In this case, it can be ar-
gued that increased violence is partly due to the exclusion of the Darfur rebels of the peace ne-
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Moreover, we need to have precise hypotheses for the exact link between the specific con-
text conditions and the affected areas. Table 2 gives an overview on some of the possible 
hypotheses. It is beyond doubt, however, that these hypotheses are tentative and should 
be subject to further sophistication in the future. Especially pre- and non-resource context 
conditions should be systematically added to a theoretical framework.23 
 
Table 2: Tentative Hypotheses for Context-Dependent Effects of Natural Resources 
Resource specific 
condition 
Direct effect on…  Most favourable  Least favourable 
Peace & security  Obstructable 
Non-lootable 
Non-Obstructable  
Lootable 
Type 
Socio-economic development Stable or constantly grow-
ing commodity prices 
Volatile or declining com-
modity prices 
  Democracy (likelihood of 
political conditionality) 
Externally non-sensitive  Externally sensitive 
Geographic location  Peace & security (secession-
ism) 
Regions not in conflict with 
central government 
Regions traditionally in 
conflict with central gov-
ernment 
Technical mode of 
exploitation 
Peace & security 
(resource looting) 
High technical level (e.g. 
deep shaft gems) 
Low technical level 
(e.g. alluvial gems) 
Degree of depend-
ence 
Socio-economic development Low 
Different commodities 
High 
One single commodity 
Degree of abundance 
(revenue potential 
per head) 
Socio-economic development High  Low 
Revenue manage-
ment 
Socio-economic development Transparent 
High capacity 
Development oriented 
Non transparent 
Low capacity 
Corrupt 
Involved companies 
and operators 
Quality of institu-
tions/Transparency 
Big “reputable” & respon-
sive MNCs 
Involvement of IFI 
Small “high-risk” compa-
nies or small operators and 
artisans 
 
 
                                                       
23   For somewhat similar hypotheses related to type and violence respectively, see Ross (2003; 
2003c). Boschini et al. (2004) show that whether or not natural resources affect growth depends 
on the interplay of general context (governance) and resource specific context conditions (type). Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   31 
 
 
 
6.4 Choosing Appropriate Research Designs 
As for general research designs, the empirical study of the political economy has been 
characterised by the juxtaposition of quantitative (statistical) studies and in-depth country 
case studies (s. Ross 2003c, 2004). Their respective merits are not to be denied, yet both 
have their shortcomings, which should be outlined briefly. 
In quantitative studies all variables have to be quantified in one way or another in order 
to process the data statistically. This requires reliable and valid data, which are often not 
available in the quantity and quality that is desirable. This is commonly due to the lack of 
(reliable) statistics or the fact that the phenomenon under investigation is hard to quan-
tify, and some of the variables involved in the political economy of natural resources, such 
as the quality of institutions and the resource sector management, clearly belong to these 
problematic variables. Using proximate indicators cannot be avoided fully in quantitative 
studies, but shortcomings such as mixing up dependence and abundance can be over-
come and, indeed, this has already been accomplished (s. de Soysa 2000).  
Moreover, since we need large numbers of cases for meaningful statistical control, the 
number of tested variables is commonly relatively low and it is not possible to embark on 
in-depth testing of single variables and cases. Hence, statistical control is rather a rough 
brush. It is very strong with regard to generalisation (both on description and correla-
tions), but not that strong with regard to explaining exceptions and the exact mechanism 
of causation. Generally, quantitative approaches aim at establishing probabilistic relation-
ships. At best, one will discover that adverse effects of natural resources are most prob-
able under a certain set of variables. But individual cases tend to disappear behind coeffi-
cients. Especially when correlations are very high, scholars do not bother too much about 
explaining deviant cases and settle for their probabilistic models. 
Single case studies avoid the “rough brush” since they are obviously capable of in-depth 
analysis and this is usually more or less accomplished. However, single case studies suffer 
from a number of other shortcomings: Frequently yet not necessarily, theoretical reflec-
tions are widely considered obsolete and a large number of single case studies tend to be 
descriptive or anecdotal rather than systematic. Moreover, the potential of single case 
studies to choose deviant cases or exceptions from general tendencies is rarely exploited 
(s. Eckstein 1975). Case studies on the resource curse tend to choose “positive” examples 
of the “curse” such as Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone rather than full or partial excep-
tions such as Botswana or Gabon. Whereas these problems can and should be relatively 
easily overcome in the future, one limitation of single case studies cannot be resolved. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  32 
 
 
 
Single cases are inevitably incapable of providing a sound basis for generalisations. At 
best, the case under investigation can be plausibly explained; whether the respective ex-
planations apply to other cases must be subjected to further comparison. 
Hence, comparative research designs which examine a relatively small but carefully se-
lected number of countries more in-depth (“Small N comparison”) appear to be the most 
appropriate research designs for a future study of the political economy of natural re-
sources in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. This is not to say that other research strate-
gies are obsolete or should be replaced by the comparative method. Given the wide ab-
sence of sophisticated comparisons in the political economy of natural resources24, a com-
parative research design is rather another methodology that should be added to the tool 
box, since comparison, if applied adequately, can be very effective in isolating exact 
mechanisms of causal relationships.  
Of course, the isolating power of the comparative method depends on the respective re-
search design. In this respect the selection of cases must be organised along similarities 
and differences within the context conditions and the operative variables, i.e. those phe-
nomena of which we want to know a relationship. The most promising option is to apply 
a “most-similar system” or a “comparable cases strategy” (s. Sartori 1994; Lijphart 1975), 
in which all or a large number of (relevant) variables are similar except for the variables 
between which a relationship is hypothesized. In fact, conditions like that constitute a 
natural experiment and respective settings are hard to be found in real cases. At best, 
most of the time it will be possible to have an approximate most similar system which is 
better than giving in to social complexity. A respective research design should include 
cases that share similar degrees of abundance in and dependence on natural resources 
and at least some pertinent non-resource conditions yet show differences with regard to 
the areas the resource curse is said to affect. An identical framework of analysis including 
respective hypotheses (all contextual conditions) should be applied to single out the key 
relationships. A study of this kind, at least approximately, has been conducted on the link 
between the mode of extraction (alluvial diamonds) and civil war (Snyder/Bhavnani 
2004). 
Another option is to apply an approximate “most-different system” (s. Sartori 1994): The 
problem can be tackled adversely by identifying exceptional resource rich or dependent 
cases that differ in a high number of aspects yet have apparently been spared by the 
                                                       
24   Exceptions are the comparison of Nigeria and Indonesia (Bevan/Collier/Gunning 1999), the 
medium N comparison of 13 violent resource rich countries by Ross (2003c) and the Small N 
study (Ghana,Guinea and Sierra Leone) by Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani (2004). Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   33 
 
 
 
“curse”. Having selected respective cases, possibly drawn from all over the world and not 
Africa alone, respective hypotheses can be applied to single out why the “paradox of 
plenty” has not prevailed.  
Both strategies differ significantly to Ross’ (2003c: 10; 2004) who, in his “Medium-N 
Analysis”, selects 13 countries on the basis of the assumption that natural resources are 
“most likely” connected to violence in these cases. Ross does not aim at examining the 
relative causal weight of contextual variables vis à vis natural resources but instead at 
identifying causal mechanisms and their variations by using a number of hypotheses of 
different transmission channels and aspects of violence, such as duration and intensity. 
He does not exploit differences in outcomes fully since non-violent cases are a priori ex-
cluded. Nevertheless, this methodological approach is highly fruitful and his findings are 
consistent with our assumption that the effects of natural resources are far more complex 
than commonly assumed and that they depend on contextual conditions. Moreover, his 
six findings25 could hardly have been established without using this particular research 
design.  
As a matter of fact, comparative research designs have to be created by scholars according 
to their research question and the empirical situation. For example, the hypothesis that 
pre-resource country conditions are of superior explanatory value can be tested by exam-
ining the historical conditions before resource extraction in a number of countries that 
differ with regard to areas and intensity of possible detrimental effects by natural re-
sources. 
As argued above, the process should not stop here: Promising and consolidated hypothe-
ses can be put to the test in a more quantitative manner afterwards. It is not one method 
that is preferable at any time and any place, but their combination at different stages of 
the scientific process. 
 
                                                       
25  These findings include: Resource wealth and civil war are not linked by a single mechanism. 
Resource wealth does not always make existing conflicts worse. Resources offer means for pre-
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7. Conclusions: What Can Be Done? 
The huge body of literature on the “resource curse” provides several explanations for the 
detrimental effects of natural resources. Affected areas include socio-economic develop-
ment, the quality of institutions and governance, the prospects for democracy and human 
rights as well as peace and security. However, if at all, the “curse” is a mere probability 
and a number of examples, in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, clearly indicate that con-
text conditions have to be added to the equation when studying the exact mechanisms 
and transmission channels of the “curse”. These context conditions deserve differentiation 
and we have argued for a distinction between non- and pre-resource extraction conditions 
(such as the general level of development, relations between identity groups, the political 
systems etc.) and resource specific conditions (such as type, location, mode of extraction, 
degree of abundance and dependence, resource revenue management etc.). Moreover, the 
theoretical challenge of a contextually sensitive study of the political economy of natural 
resources must capture complexity beyond that distinction. This applies to dynamics and 
interplays between the context conditions as well as to the direction and nature of the re-
lationship between resources and possibly affected areas which, by now, seems to be 
widely confined to purely negative effects. In the more narrow methodological sense, we 
argue in favour of precise concepts and carefully formulated hypotheses that integrate 
complexity rather than simplify the relationship. As for methodologies, the paper recom-
mends adding sophisticated comparative designs (“Small and Medium N”) to the tool 
box, with which one could isolate causal relationships and study the mechanisms more in-
depth than with quantitative approaches and case studies. 
Albeit the development of practical recommendations is not the purpose of this paper, we 
do not suggest that future research on resource politics should be limited to the ivory 
tower. In fact, a contextually sensitive study of the political economy of natural resources 
seems to be a precondition for the development of promising measures to tackle respec-
tive adverse effects.  
The debate is already moving towards concrete recommendations, especially with regard 
to peacebuilding: USAID has developed a “toolkit for intervention” (USAID 2004), the 
World Bank has outlined “options and actions” to be taken by the international commu-
nity (Bannon/Collier 2003). The Catholic Relief Services (Gary/Karl 2003: 79-82) have de-
veloped an exhaustive list of “recommendations” which advises numerous actors pre-
cisely what they should do. Respective recommendations include a variety of measures 
such as promoting governance, participation and supervision (s. appendix V).  Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   35 
 
 
 
These recommendations by far exceed international initiatives such as the “Publish What 
You Pay” campaign (Parham in Traub-Merz 2004), the “Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative” (EITI) and already more or less operational control and/or management 
regimes such as in Chad (s. Gary/Karl 2003: 73-76; Gary/Reisch 2005) or the Kimberley 
Process (Paes 2005), including many if not all of the contextual variables we have devel-
oped. 
Whether all these measures will work in Africa and elsewhere is of course highly ques-
tionable. This is not only because it is easier to make recommendations than to implement 
and enforce them. In fact, it might prove premature to draw practical conclusions before 
the puzzle has been resolved completely. From our point of view, the success of measures 
of intervention and prevention will depend on more knowledge of: 
•   The exact role of general socio-economic and political conditions in general and in 
a given country (pre- and non-resource context) 
•   The exact role of resource specific conditions in general and in a given country 
•   The exact role of regional and international environments in general and in a given 
country 
•   The exact interplays, relative weights and dynamics of these conditions in general 
and in a given country. 
 
It is, for instance, questionable whether one can transfer the relatively successful “Kimber-
ley process” mechanism in the diamond sector to the oil sector. Wolf-Christian Paes (2005) 
has pointed out that, since diamonds have a very limited strategic significance for the 
global economy, it is much easier to agree on a control regime. The same applies to differ-
ent country cases. Obviously, any measures of intervention and prevention should be de-
signed according to the country or case specific conditions.  
Therefore, identifying complex and dynamic causal mechanisms and different scenarios 
in different countries should be part of the future research agenda precisely because we 
want to tackle the problem adequately. There is no successful therapy without a careful 
diagnosis. 
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Appendix I: Areas Possibly Affected by the Resource Curse and Transmission 
Channels* 
Socio-Economic De-
velopment (Growth) 
Governance and Insti-
tutions 
Democracy and Hu-
man Rights 
Peace and Security 
•   Lack of positive 
side(-)effects (“exter-
nalities”) in resource 
sectors on other sec-
tors (learning-by-
doing, scale econo-
mies, backward and 
forward linkages) 
•   Decline of other 
tradable sectors 
(Dutch disease)  
•   Misguided eco-
nomic policies (white 
elephants, inflated 
public employment, 
import substitution, 
excessive borrowing) 
•   Macroeconomic 
vulnerability (com-
modity price volatility 
or decline) 
•   Colonial legacy of 
“extractive states” 
•   Build-up of a ren-
tier state fuelling:  
-extreme corruption 
-clientelism and 
neopatrimonialism 
-politically motivated 
& ineffective state 
activity in economy 
-weak state institu-
tions (bureaucracy) 
•   Lack of economic 
and social moderniza-
tion 
•   Lack of govern-
ment accountability 
and countervailing 
powers 
•   Opportunity to co-
opt and/or repress 
opposition 
•   Foreign interest in 
resources makes joint 
pro-democratic politi-
cal conditionality less 
likely and less promis-
ing 
•   Internal motive of 
grievance (exclusion of 
resource benefits and 
ecological damage) 
•   Internal motive of 
greed (control over 
state apparatus & re-
source revenue) 
•   External motive to 
intervene (foreign 
national interest: profi-
teering, energy sup-
ply, rivalries) 
•   Opportunity to 
build & maintain mili-
tary & rebel forces 
(“war economy”) 
•   Opportunity for 
guerrilla attacks and 
sabotage (extraction 
facilities) 
* The table covers the more direct effects. Indirect effects are captured by figure 2. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   43 
 
 
 
Appendix II: General and Resource Specific Context Conditions 
Context I  Context II 
General and Country Specific Conditions 
(pre- and non-resource context) 
Resource Specific Conditions 
Level of socio-economic development  
Relations between Identity groups  
Political System  
Behavioural Patterns of actors  
Externalities (regional and international setting 
and processes, especially international eco-
nomic relations) 
Etc. 
 
Type, location and technical modes of exploita-
tion 
Degree of abundance 
Degree of dependence 
Resource sector management (primarily reve-
nues) 
Actors involved in production and manage-
ment (MNCs, state enterprises and agencies, 
international economic relations) 
Communities directly affected by production 
and management 
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Appendix III: Socio-economic and Political Profile of Resource Rich Countries against 
Sub-Saharan Mean 
 Development  Governance  Democracy  Peace 
 Annual 
growth of 
GDP  
1990-2003 
HDI-
value 
Government 
Effectiveness 
2002 (0-100) 
Freedom House 
rating 2004 (7-1) 
AKUF Internal vio-
lent conflict since last 
10 years** 
Angola 3.2  0.381  9.8  Not  free  5.5  Yes** 
Botswana 4.7  0.589  79.9  Free 2  No 
CAR 1.8  0.361  4.6  Not  free  6  Yes 
Congo, DR  -3.9  0.365  1.5  Not free  6  Yes** 
Congo, R.  1.8  0.494  8.2  Partly free  4.5  Yes 
Equatorial-
guinea 
20.8* 0.703  5.7  Not  free  6.5 
No 
Gabon -0.2*  0.648  39.7  Partly  free  4.5  No 
Guinea 4.2  0.425  24.7  Not  free  5.5 No 
Liberia 4.7*  -  3.1  Not  free  6 Yes 
Namibia 3.7  0.607  62.9  Free  2.5  No 
Nigeria 2.7  0.466 10.8  Partly  free  4  Yes** 
Sierra Leone  -3.1  0.273  2.6  Partly free  3.5  Yes 
South Africa  2.3  0.666  69.1  Free  1.5  No 
Sudan N/a  0.505  11.3  Not  free  7  Yes* 
Sub-saharan 
mean 
2.7 0.465  28.9  Partly  free  4.24  - 
* Refers to 1990-2002;  
** Ongoing violent conflict in early 2005; column 2: countries between 2.2 und 3.2 are coded as average; col-
umn 3: countries between 0.415 and 0.515 are coded average: column 4: countries between 20.1 and 39.9 are 
coded “average”; column 5 (7 worst, 1 best rating): countries between 3.75 and 5.0 are rated “average”. Col-
umn 6: yes is coded below average (-), no is coded above average (+). 
 
Sources:  
World Bank (2004): The World Bank World Development Report 2005. A Better Investment Climate for Eve-
ryone, Washington D.C.: Oxford Univ. Press, GDP per capita rank and data for 1990-2002, in: 
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/index_countries.cfm. 
World Bank; GRICS: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot, in: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/worldmap.asp#map. 
Freedom House, in: www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf. 
AKUF, in: www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/kriege_afrika.htm. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa   45 
 
 
 
Appendix IV: Potential Income p.c. from Resource Revenues 
Appendix IVa: Diamond Production and Potential Income (p.c.) in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Dependence  on 
diamonds as a 
ratio of ex-
portsa (%) 
Diamond 
Production 
2001 in ctb 
Diamond pro-
duction 2001 
in US$b 
Population 
2001 (m)a 
Potential in-
come per 
capita p.a 
US$c 
Botswana 82  26,146,000  2,193,870,000 1.7  1290.51 
South Africa  10  11,301,000  1,114,655,000 43.2  25.80 
Angola 11  5,871,000  803,145,000 13.5  59.49 
DRC 58  19,637,000  496,310,000 52.4  9.47 
Namibia 41  1,502,000  322,340,000 1.8  179.08 
Guinea 4  754,000  128,180,000 7.6  16.8 
CAR 41  614,000  92,100,000 3.8  24.24 
Sierra Leone  -  375,000  67,500,000 5.1  13.2 
Liberia -  155,000  23,250,000 3.2  7.27 
Sources: 
a. Afrika-Jahrbuch 2002;  
b. www.terraconsult.be/overview.htm;  
c. own calculation. 
 
 
Appendix IVb: Oil Dependence and Potential Income (p.c.) from Export Earnings 
 
 
Dependence on 
oil in % of ex-
port (2002)a 
Oil production 
in b/d (2002)a 
Export earn-
ings 2002 (in 
US$m)a 
Population 
2002 (m)b 
Potential inco-
me per capita 
p.c./p.a.US$c 
Nigeria 75.9  2,013,000  13,680  132.8  103.01 
Angola 87.1  905,000  5,690  13.1  434.35 
Sudan 77.5  233,000  1,510.9  32.8  46.06 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
92.0 237,000  2,713.2  0.5  5,426.4 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
93.6 259,000  2,294.0  3.7  620.00 
Gabon 80.5  295,000  2,551.9  1.3  1,963.00 
Sources:  
a. Neumann 2005; 
b. Afrika-Jahrbuch 2003;  
c. own calculation. Basedau: Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa  46 
 
 
 
Appendix V: Measures of Intervention and Prevention 
“Toolkit of Intervention”  
(USAID 2004) 
“Actions and Options “ 
(World Bank; Ban-
non/Collier 2003) 
Relevant Actors for Interven-
tion (Catholic Relief Services; 
Gary/Karl 2003)* 
•   Empower local communities 
through information access 
•   Increase participation, dia-
logue, and partnership 
•   Create sustainable livelihoods 
for artisanal and small-scale 
miners 
•   Reduce macroeconomic de-
pendence and vulnerability 
•   Address gaps in national gov-
ernance of host countries 
•   Promote responsible behavior 
by large and small companies 
•   Strengthen Governance of the 
international mineral trade 
•   Create a safe space of reform 
•   Monitor and assess develop-
ment 
•   Reporting resource 
revenues (who gets the 
money?) 
•   Commodity tracking 
systems (Where did it 
come from?) 
•   Follow the money 
(The finance of illicit 
resource extraction) 
•   Getting it done (In-
struments of enforce-
ment) 
•   Attracting reputable 
companies to risky en-
vironments 
•   Dampening price 
shocks 
•   National governments of 
oil exporters 
•   International oil companies 
•   The U.S. and other North-
ern governments 
•   The World Bank and the 
IMF 
•   Export Credit Agencies 
•   United Nations 
•   Civil Society 
* Refers to oil only; some 40 detailed recommendations are given. 